



NDIA NAVAL INTEROPERABILITY WORKSHOP




# Aegis Combat System Interoperability - Designing, Building and Testing


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



# ***Outline***




- ***Aegis Combat System Engineering Agent (CSEA)  
View***
- ***Aegis Baseline 6 III Interoperability Initiatives***
- ***Lessons Learned and Shortfalls***
- ***Summary***

# Aegis CSEA View



***System Development “Business As Usual” will Not Achieve Interoperability Improvement***


# Background



- ***CEC OPEVAL events led to formation of an Interoperability Task Force Senior System Engineering Council***
  - ***Tasked to resolve System problems, point solution for CEC OPEVAL***
  - ***ITF Link/ID/Interoperability team investigated 166 problems and corrected 38 over 17 months***
- ***Concurrently PMS 400B asked, How can we improve interoperability during development?***
- ***Lockheed Martin developed new test initiative to identify and correct interoperability problems during Baseline 6 Phase III development***

***Interoperability Improvement Required Infrastructure and Process Changes, I.e. Not “Business As Usual”***


# ***New Test Initiative – What to Do?***




- ***Develop a system test infrastructure that would stimulate multiple systems during development***
  - ***An infrastructure that supported:***
    - ***an ability to generate and distribute common dynamic tracks to be processed by multiple systems.***
    - ***computer generated scenarios that would replicate operationally based experience.***
- ***Develop a robust test criteria with quantitative performance measurements***
- ***Develop test methodologies that facilitate:***
  - ***Iterative cross system problem identification***
  - ***Coordinated developer investigation***
  - ***System wide problem resolution and validation***

***Move Away From Sterile Single Ship Test Environments,  
Validating S/W Requirements.... Move towards  
Testing The Way The Ship Fights***

# New Test Initiative – How To Do It



# ***Multi-Aegis Combat System (MACS)***



- ***High-fidelity interoperability testing using operationally based scenarios on a distributed network***
  - ***Distribute tracks via Distribute Interface Simulator (DIS)***
  - ***Connect TADILS via Aegis Broadcast Network (ABN-16)***
  - ***Connect CEC via secure LAN***
- ***Supplements***
  - ***Navy Link Certification***
  - ***Link exercises with Patriot/THAAD,E-2, ACDS***
- ***Provides***
  - ***Common sensor environment***
    - ***Multi-aircraft , Multi-TBM***
    - ***Simultaneous AAW and TBM***

***Built Battle Force Rancocas***

# Battle Force Rancocas



PTC-2




XYLAN Switch

ACSIS DIS Network .47

Direct Connect  
via  
NSCC F/O LAN


ABN-16




CSEDS



3rd Deck




2nd Deck





# MACS Interoperability Test Goals


## Temp 801 Based Criteria




### Level Definition (Abridged)

- **Engagement Support/Coordination:** Exploitation of integrated tack data and connectivity to support and coordinate air/TBM engagements
- **Track Integration:** The fusion of local and remote sensor data and track parameters (correlation, decorrelation, mutual tracking)
- **Information Management:** The storage and management of local and remote track parameter data (ID, IFF, etc.)
  - **Data Registration:** The corrective alignment of local and remote track position and kinematic data
  - **Data Exchange:** The sharing of data at the element and unit level
- **Developmental Testing:** Verification of MACS test architecture and procedures


# Test Process



# ACSYS Scenario Used for Data Registration Testing




Scenario	Permutation	Section	Recommended script name
1. Baseline AAW	1. Single threat (bandit A)	A2.1.1.1	6P3_INT_BASE_AAW1
1. Baseline AAW	2. Single threat (bandit B)	A2.1.3.1	6P3_INT_BASE_AAW2
1. Baseline AAW	3. Dual threat (bandit A & B)	A2.1.3.2	6P3_INT_BASE_AAW3
2. Baseline AAW mode swap	1. Single threat (bandit A)	A2.2.1.1	6P3_INT_BASE2_AAW1
2. Baseline AAW mode swap	2. Single threat (bandit B)	A2.2.3.1	6P3_INT_BASE2_AAW2
2. Baseline AAW mode swap	3. Dual threat (bandit A & B)	A2.2.3.2	6P3_INT_BASE2_AAW3
3. Dual-Axis AAW threat	N/A	A2.3	6P3_INT_BASE3_AAW1
4. Modified Dual-Axis AAW threat	1. Single ASCM salvos	A2.4	6P3_INT_BASE4_AAW1
4. Modified Dual-Axis AAW threat	2. Two ASCM salvos	A2.4	6P3_INT_BASE4_AAW2
4. Modified Dual-Axis AAW threat	3. Three ASCM salvos	A2.4	6P3_INT_BASE4_AAW3
4. Modified Dual-Axis AAW threat	4. Four ASCM salvos	A2.4	6P3_INT_BASE4_AAW4
5. Baseline HVA AAW	1. Two ASCM salvos	A2.5	6P3_INT_BASE5_AAW1
5. Baseline HVA AAW	2. Four ASCM salvos	A2.5	6P3_INT_BASE5_AAW2
5. Baseline HVA AAW	3. Six ASCM salvos	A2.5	6P3_INT_BASE5_AAW3



# ***Data Registration Testing:***



## ***An Example***




- ***MACS test matrix identifies 11 priority link specific data registration test goals and pass/ fail criteria for:***
  - ***Relative Gridlock***
  - ***IU Registration***
  - ***Sensor Registration***
  - ***Developed ACSIS DIS scenario to inject sensor error that requires compensation using data registration***
- ***Initial results***
  - ***Failed on visual inspection: Tracks jumped wildly while conducting relative gridlock throughout scenario***
  - ***Data analysis identified C2PR N-1-3033, SGS/AC Sensor Registration application and C&D program problems***
  - ***All fixes verified***
  - ***Basic Relative Gridlock, IU Registration, and Sensor Registration functionality passed***

***Success Story, But Required Five Month Iterative Process***


# ***Relative Gridlock Test Result: Aegis-Aegis Mutual Track***




# Sensor and IU Registration Results



# Sensor and IU Registration Limitations



# MACS Lessons Learned




- *Developmental testing should be conducted in small doses with limited objectives*
- *Test configuration very challenging*
  - *Most resource intensive test configuration we employ*
  - *Developmental testing demands large test time investment per test objective*
- *Test architecture needed thorough testing and debugging*
- *Testing generates heavy data analysis demands*
- *DIS essential for TBMD interoperability testing*

*Finding and Fixing Interoperability Problems  
is an Iterative Time Consuming Process*



# Summary



- ***Lockheed Martin NE&SS-Surface Systems initiated MACS testing in response to PMS 400B direction to “improve interoperability”***
- ***Infrastructure developed and testing in progress***
- ***Experienced growing pains***
- ***Testing has exposed problems that otherwise would be difficult to find or collect data on***
- ***The use of DIS architecture has proven a necessity for TBMD interoperability testing***
- ***Test shortfalls that affect ability to find and quickly resolve problems***
  - ***Architecture / equipment***
  - ***Analysis tools***
  - ***Availability / participation of all elements developers***

***Interoperability is Not a Goal, It's a Process***